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SNYDER V. PHELPS: SEARCHING FOR A LEGAL STANDARD 
Leslie C. Griffin* 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The case of Snyder v. Phelps1 offers an array of legal issues in 
search of clearer legal standards. The original lawsuit by plaintiff Albert 
Snyder, father of the deceased soldier Matthew Snyder, against 
defendants Fred W. Phelps, his Westboro Baptist Church, and other 
church members for their picketing of Matthew’s funeral and their 
website’s “epic” account of Matthew’s life, pleaded five tort causes of 
actions under Maryland law for defamation, intrusion upon seclusion, 
publicity given to private life, intentional infliction of emotional distress 
and civil conspiracy.2 The district court dismissed the defamation and 
publicity claims. The jury found the defendants liable on the other three 
theories and awarded plaintiff $2.9 million in compensatory damages 
and $8 million in punitive damages. The district court remitted the 
punitive damages award to $2.1 million.3 
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed, ruling that the First 
Amendment required a judgment for the defendants as a matter of law 
“[b]ecause the judgment [incorrectly] attaches tort liability to 
constitutionally protected speech . . . .”4 Preaching the doctrine of 
constitutional avoidance, however, a concurrence by Judge Shedd 
concluded that there was insufficient evidence to establish tort liability 
under Maryland law.5 There was no intrusion upon seclusion because the 
defendants never disrupted the funeral service, confronted the plaintiff, 
called the websites to his attention or intruded upon Snyder’s privacy in 
any way.6 Moreover, Phelps’ conduct was not sufficiently “outrageous” 
 
 *  Larry & Joanne Doherty Chair in Legal Ethics, University of Houston Law Center; 
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1
 580 F.3d 206 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. granted 130 S. Ct. 1737 (2010). 
 
2
 Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F.Supp.2d 567 (D. Md. 2008). 
 
3
 Id. at 595. 
 
4
 580 F.3d at 226. 
 
5
 Id. at 227 (Shedd, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 
6
 Id. at 230-31. 
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to meet the requirements of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress. In Maryland, intentional infliction of emotional distress requires 
the element of extreme and outrageous conduct.7 Despite the jury’s 
finding for Snyder on this tort, Judge Shedd concluded that Phelps’ 
conduct in protesting the funeral “simply does not satisfy the heavy 
burden required for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress 
under Maryland law.”8 Because the defendants had not raised the 
sufficiency of the evidence claims in their appeal, however, the other 
judges rejected Shedd’s reasoning, held the appellants had waived the 
evidence argument, and decided the case on First Amendment grounds.9 
Snyder’s petition for a writ of certiorari presented three questions 
for the Supreme Court to decide: 
 
1. Does Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell apply to a private person 
versus another private person concerning a private matter? 
2. Does the First Amendment’s freedom of speech tenet trump the 
First Amendment’s freedom of religion and peaceful assembly? 
3. Does an individual attending a family member’s funeral constitute 
a captive audience who is entitled to state protection from unwanted 
communication?10 
 
The three questions presented and the underlying opinions 
suggest that the case is about religion, tort law and free speech. Snyder 
v. Phelps concerns tort law and free speech, and offers the Court an 
opportunity to clarify the constitutional law of defamation and privacy 
lawsuits involving speech. But it should not be a case about religion. 
 
I.     RELIGION 
 
The Petition’s second question forces us to consider what role 
religion played in the case, and we should conclude that religion 
should be irrelevant to the outcome of Snyder v. Phelps. The district 
judge rejected defendants’ argument that their conduct could not be 
subjected to tort liability because the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment protects their religion from the jury’s review. The court 
relied upon the traditional First Amendment doctrine that although the 
freedom to believe is absolute, the government may regulate religious 
 
 
7
 Id. at 232. 
 
8
 Id. The conspiracy claim required that the underlying torts of inclusion or IIED be proven 
and so was dismissed when they were. See id. at 232 n.3. 
 
9
 Id. at 216-17. 
 
10
 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i-ii, Snyder v. Phelps, No. 09-751 (U.S. Dec. 23, 2009), 
2009 WL 5115222. 
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conduct. Because “this case involves balancing [religious freedom] 
rights with the rights of other private citizens to avoid being verbally 
assaulted by outrageous speech and comment during a time of 
bereavement,”11 the court rejected a Free Exercise defense. 
The defendants reasserted their religious freedom argument in their 
appeal to the Fourth Circuit, arguing that 
 
[t]his case punished defendants’ religious belief that they are 
prophets and God’s elect; their belief in God’s hate; and their belief 
in the doctrines of reprobation, election and predestination. The jury 
should not have had the opportunity to put the official governmental 
stamp of disapproval on defendants’ religious beliefs.12 
 
The Fourth Circuit, however, did not address the religious freedom 
argument, dismissing the case instead under the First Amendment’s 
Free Speech Clause. 
In rejecting defendants’ free exercise defense, the district court quoted 
Justice Antonin Scalia’s opinion in the leading Free Exercise decision, 
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith: 
 
We have never held that an individual’s religious beliefs excuse him 
from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct 
that the State is free to regulate. On the contrary, the record of more 
than a century of our free exercise jurisprudence contradicts that 
proposition.13 
 
The district court’s conclusion is unassailable. The case is a 
reminder of the importance of Smith. The Westboro Baptist Church 
should be treated like all other picketers. Matthew Snyder’s funeral at a 
Catholic Church should be treated like all other funerals. Tort law should 
not be skewed for or against religious plaintiffs and defendants. 
“‘Laws . . . are made for the government of actions, and while they 
cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with 
practices. . . . Can a man [Phelps or Snyder] excuse his practices to the 
contrary because of his religious belief? To permit this would be to make 
the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, 
and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.’”14 
Snyder v. Phelps involves tort law and free speech. Unfortunately, 
the district court repeatedly referred to defendants’ “religious opinion” in 
deciding the free speech issues. The word “religious” should be deleted 
 
 
11
 Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F.Supp.2d 567, 579 (D. Md. 2008). 
 
12
 Brief of Appellant at *13, Snyder v. Westboro Baptist Church, Inc., 580 F.3d 206 (4th Cir. 
2008) (No. 08-1026), 2008 WL 2563404 (footnote omitted). 
 
13
 533 F.Supp.2d at 579 (quoting Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-79 (1990)). 
 
14
 Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1878)). 
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and ignored. The outcome depends purely upon how constitutional free 
speech rights affect state tort law. 
 
II.     DEFAMATION 
 
The original case involved allegations of one tort designed to protect 
the plaintiff’s reputation (defamation), two torts created to protect the 
plaintiff’s privacy (intrusion and publication of private facts) and one tort 
intended to protect plaintiffs against emotional harm (intentional 
infliction of emotional distress). Ironically, Snyder’s defamation claim 
did not survive in the district court even though it is the current state of 
defamation law that determined the outcome of the privacy and emotional 
distress lawsuits and set the stage for the important first question in the 
petition for certiorari about Hustler Magazine v. Falwell.15 
Albert Snyder’s defamation claim involved the “epic” story about his 
son published on the church’s website, www.godhatesfags.com. The story, 
called “The Burden of Marine Lance Cpl. Matthew Snyder,” stated that 
Albert Snyder and his ex-wife “taught Matthew to defy his creator,” “raised 
him for the devil,” and “taught him that God was a liar.”16 Maryland 
defamation law requires “(1) that Defendants made a defamatory 
communication to a third person, (2) that the statement was false, (3) that 
Defendants were at fault in communicating the statement, and (4) that 
Plaintiff suffered harm.”17 The district court ruled that the first element was 
not satisfied “because the content of the ‘epic’ posted on the church’s 
website was essentially Phelps-Roper’s religious opinion and would not 
realistically tend to expose Snyder to public hatred or scorn.”18 That 
sentence is somewhat confusing. First, it mistakenly suggests that religious 
opinion law differs from other speech law, whereas, as noted above, 
religion should not be significant to the case. Second, it uses the expression 
“public hatred or scorn,” whereas defamation usually involves any harm to 
reputation. It would have been more direct to say that under Maryland law 
the website did not harm Albert’s reputation and conveyed only the 
church’s opinion, not any underlying false facts about Albert. 
If Albert’s lawsuit had satisfied the four elements of Maryland’s 
defamation law, the district court would have had to decide if Phelps’ 
website enjoyed free speech protection under the First Amendment. 
Starting with New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,19 the Supreme Court has 
ruled that in some circumstances states may not apply their state law 
 
 
15
 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Snyder v. Phelps, No. 09-751 (U.S. Dec. 23, 2009), 
2009 WL 5115222 (citing Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988)). 
 
16
 533 F.Supp.2d at 572. 
 
17
 Id. 
 
18
 Id. at 572-73. 
 
19
 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
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standards because the First Amendment requires greater protection of 
free speech than the state standards. In New York Times itself, the Court 
ruled that Alabama could not award damages in lawsuits against public 
officials for criticism of their official conduct without proof of actual 
malice by the defendants.20 The addition of an “actual malice” standard 
is significant because state tort law traditionally did not require any 
level of fault by the defendant, instead imposing “strict liability” or 
liability without fault. See Table 1 below for a list of the elements 
traditionally required in a defamation claim. 
 
TRADITIONAL ELEMENTS OF A 
COMMON LAW DEFAMATION SUIT 
1.     Defamatory Statement 
2.     Of and Concerning Plaintiff 
3.     Publication 
4.     Damages 
Table 1 
 
The Court later extended the New York Times rule to cover public 
figures as well as public officials.21 Then George Rosenbloom, an 
“individual who held no public office, who had not taken part in any 
public controversy, and who lived an obscure private life,” who before 
his arrest and acquittal on charges of obscenity “was just one of the 
millions of Americans who live their lives in obscurity”22 sued 
Metromedia for its report of his arrest. A plurality on a fractured Court 
voted to extend New York Times fault to “all discussion and 
communication involving matters of public or general concern, without 
regard to whether the persons involved are famous or anonymous.”23 
The full Court, however, never adopted the Rosenbloom plurality’s 
standard. Instead, defamation law became linked to some mixture of 
public and private figures with public and private concerns, as depicted 
in Table 2 below. Speech about public officials and public figures 
involving a matter of public concern is governed by New York Times.24 
Speech about private figures involving matters of public concern is 
governed by Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., which held that “so long as 
 
 
20
 Id. at 283-84. 
 
21
 Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). 
 
22
 Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 78 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 
23
 Id. at 44 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion). 
 
24
 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
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they do not impose liability without fault, the States may define for 
themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or 
broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual.”25  
Finally, Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. held that 
“speech on matters of purely private concern is of less First 
Amendment concern”26 because in such cases “‘[t]here is no threat to 
the free and robust debate of public issues; there is no potential 
interference with a meaningful dialogue of ideas concerning self-
government; and there is no threat of liability causing a reaction of self-
censorship by the press.’”27 In Dun & Bradstreet, a case involving 
private individuals and matters of private concern, the Court ruled that 
states could award presumed and punitive damages without a showing 
of New York Times actual malice.28 
 
PUBLIC OFFICIAL/FIGURE PRIVATE FIGURE 
 
     New York Times 
 
               Fault (actual malice) 
 
               Falsity 
 
     Gertz 
 
               Fault (negligence?) 
 
               Falsity 
 
     Same as  
     Dun & Bradstreet? 
 
     Dun & Bradstreet 
 
               Fault (?????) 
 
               Falsity (?????) 
Table 2 
 
 
25
 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974). 
 
26
 Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 759 (1985) (emphasis added). 
 
27
 Id. at 760 (quoting Harley-Davidson Motorsports, Inc. v. Markley, 568 P.2d 1359, 1363 
(Or. 1977)). 
 
28
 Id. at 761. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 775 (1986), offers a 
good summary of these standards: 
One can discern in these decisions two forces that may reshape the common-law 
landscape to conform to the First Amendment. The first is whether the plaintiff is a public 
official or figure, or is instead a private figure. The second is whether the speech at issue 
is of public concern. When the speech is of public concern and the plaintiff is a public 
official or public figure, the Constitution clearly requires the plaintiff to surmount a much 
higher barrier before recovering damages from a media defendant than is raised by the 
common law. When the speech is of public concern but the plaintiff is a private figure, as 
in Gertz, the Constitution still supplants the standards of the common law, but the 
constitutional requirements are, in at least some of their range, less forbidding than when 
the plaintiff is a public figure and the speech is of public concern. When the speech is of 
exclusively private concern and the plaintiff is a private figure, as in Dun & Bradstreet, 
the constitutional requirements do not necessarily force any change in at least some of the 
features of the common-law landscape. 
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The Court’s case-by-case resolution of the constitutional law of 
defamation has not been tidy. The legal standard that the states may 
employ in the private/private category is not crystal clear. The 
combinations of public and private are doubly confusing. The facts of 
Snyder v. Phelps illustrate the limits of the categories. Is Albert Snyder 
a private figure, because he is a grieving father at a funeral, or public 
because he published details of the funeral and was picketed by a well-
known group? Is Fred Phelps obviously a public figure because of his 
picketing across the country? Does his status attach to every member of 
his church? Is the funeral of an Iraq war veteran a private matter or an 
issue of public concern? Does Phelps’ presence turn every funeral into a 
matter of public concern? Should states be free in the private/private 
category to set their own standards (including no-fault standards) or 
must the Court “constitutionalize the entire common law of libel”?29 
Many Court observers have been puzzled about the Court’s 
granting certiorari in Snyder v. Phelps.30 Is it possible that someone 
persuaded the Justices to clean up defamation law, either by clarifying 
the categories or replacing them with something better? A leading 
constitutional law hornbook, in a section entitled “The Future of the 
‘Public Concern’ Doctrine” warns that in Rosenbloom, 
 
Justices Marshall, Stewart and Harlan in dissent warned that courts 
are not equipped for such an ill-defined task inevitably involving ad 
hoc balancing. Courts ‘will be required to somehow pass on the 
legitimacy of interest in a particular event or subject; what 
information is relevant to self-government. The danger such a 
doctrine portends for freedom of the press seems apparent.’ Judges 
are not able to determine what is ‘public concern’ without examining 
the contents of the speech and then applying their subjective 
judgments. It may well be that the road the Powell plurality in Dun 
& Bradstreet seeks to travel will end in a dead end, as it did the last 
time the Court took that route.31 
 
Would the Roberts Court, recently criticized for its overruling of 
important precedents,32 rewrite the framework established by Dun & 
Bradstreet, Gertz and that towering symbol of the Warren Court, New 
York Times? Or does it have lesser goals in mind? In order to figure out 
if Snyder will lead us away from a constitutional dead end, it is time to 
understand why defamation was important to a lawsuit whose claim for 
defamation was dismissed. 
 
 
29
 Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 761 n.7. 
 
30
 580 F.3d 206 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. granted 130 S. Ct. 1737 (2010). 
 
31
 JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16.16, 
at 682-83 (3d ed. 2007) (emphasis added). 
 
32
 See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (No. 08-205). 
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III. INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 
 
Even though the defamation count was dismissed, the law of 
defamation remained relevant to Snyder v. Phelps because of the 
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. In Hustler Magazine v. 
Falwell,33 the Court ruled that the evangelist Jerry Falwell, a public figure, 
could not recover emotional distress damages for a parody ad published by 
Hustler Magazine absent a showing “that the publication contains a false 
statement ‘of fact’ made with actual knowledge that the statement was 
false or with reckless disregard of whether or not it was true.”34 In other 
words, New York Times applies to intentional infliction of emotional 
distress cases involving speech (as well as to other privacy torts35). 
There are tort as well as constitutional law reasons for Hustler’s 
holding. In tort law, courts do not allow plaintiffs to do an end run 
around prohibited lawsuits by relabeling the same tort under a different 
name. The Supreme Court of Virginia, for example, dismissed a lawsuit 
for intentional infliction of emotional distress by a husband against his 
wife’s boyfriend who disrupted their marriage because Virginia does 
not allow lawsuits for alienation of affection.36 To allow a distress 
lawsuit for the same conduct would undermine the Virginia statute 
prohibiting lawsuits based on adultery. In constitutional law, if speech is 
protected by the First Amendment, then the speaker should not be 
subjected to any tort liability for protected speech whether the tort is 
labeled defamation, privacy or intentional infliction of emotional 
distress. If New York Times, then Hustler. 
Snyder’s claim for emotional distress was based not only on the 
website statements considered above, but also on the content of the signs 
held by church members during the picketing of the funeral. The district 
court ruled that some of the signs, such as “Thank God for Dead 
Soldiers,” “Semper Fi Fags,” “You’re Going to Hell,” and “God Hates 
You,” created issues of fact for the jury because they “could be 
interpreted as being directed at the Snyder family . . . .”37 Fred Phelps 
argued that the emotional distress tort could not be applied against him 
because Snyder was a public figure involved in a matter of public 
concern. The district court rejected Phelps’ argument, concluding that 
“[d]efendants cannot by their own actions transform a private funeral into 
a public event and then bootstrap their position by arguing that Matthew 
 
 
33
 485 U.S. 46 (1988). 
 
34
 Nowak & Rotunda, supra note 31, § 16.15, at 677. 
 
35
 See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) (applying NYT actual malice to a false light 
privacy tort). 
 
36
 McDermott v. Reynolds, 530 S.E.2d 902 (Va. 2000); see also MARC A. FRANKLIN, 
ROBERT L. RABIN, & MICHAEL D. GREEN, TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 920-31 (8th ed. 2006). 
 
37
 Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 578 (D. Md. 2008). 
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Snyder was a public figure.”38 Through the intentional infliction of 
emotional distress tort, therefore, the defamation categories remained 
relevant to the court’s decision even though the defamation count was 
dismissed. The district court believed the lawsuit involved the 
private/private category. 
Over Phelps’ objection, the trial court instructed the jury: 
 
As to the particular subject matter of the speech, a distinction has 
been drawn between matters of public and private concern. Where 
the speech is directed at private people and matters of private 
concern, the Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment 
interest in protecting particular types of speech must be balanced 
against a state’s interest in protecting its residents from wrongful 
injury. You must balance the Defendants’ expression of religious 
belief with another citizen’s right to privacy and his or her right to be 
free from intentional, reckless, or extreme and outrageous conduct 
causing him or her severe emotional distress. As I have previously 
indicated to you at the start of this case, you as the judges of the facts 
in this case must determine whether the Defendants’ actions were 
directed specifically at the Snyder family. If you do so determine, 
you must then determine whether those actions would be highly 
offensive to a reasonable person, whether they were extreme and 
outrageous and whether these actions were so offensive and shocking 
as to not be entitled to First Amendment protection.39 
 
The Fourth Circuit concluded that this instruction was incorrect,40 
but instead of remanding for a new trial ruled that the First Amendment 
barred the lawsuit completely and vacated the jury’s verdict.41 
The grounds of the Fourth Circuit’s decision are confusing, 
however, and reinforce the idea that the law of defamation is 
unsatisfactory. The appeals court rejected the district court’s conclusion 
that Snyder is a private/private case and instead stated that the facts 
involved a matter of public concern. Concerning the signs “America is 
Doomed,” “God Hates the USA/Thank God for 9/11,” “Pope in Hell,” 
“Fag Troops,” “Semper Fi Fags,” “Thank God for Dead Soldiers,” “Don’t 
Pray for the USA,” “Thank God for IEDs,” “Priests Rape Boys,” and 
“God Hates Fags,” the court concluded that as “utterly distasteful as these 
signs are, they involve matters of public concern, including the issue of 
homosexuals in the military, the sex-abuse scandal within the Catholic 
Church, and the political and moral conduct of the United States and its 
citizens. Such issues are not subjects of ‘purely private concern. . . .’”42 
 
 
38
 Id. at 577. 
 
39
 Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 214-15 (4th Cir. 2009) (emphasis added). 
 
40
 Id. at 221. 
 
41
 Id. at 226. 
 
42
 Id. at 222-23 (citing Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 759 
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At that point the court might have remanded the case to be retried 
under the Gertz private figure/public concern standard. Instead, it 
dismissed the lawsuit on the grounds that the “type of speech” at issue 
was protected by the First Amendment: 
 
There are two subcategories of speech that cannot reasonably be 
interpreted as stating actual facts about an individual, and that 
thus constitute speech that is constitutionally protected. First, the 
First Amendment serves to protect statements on matters of 
public concern that fail to contain a “provably false factual 
connotation.” . . . Second, rhetorical statements employing “loose, 
figurative, or hyperbolic language” are entitled to First 
Amendment protection to ensure that “public debate will not 
suffer for lack of ‘imaginative expression’ or the ‘rhetorical 
hyperbole’ which has traditionally added much to the discourse of 
our Nation.”43 
 
The signs and website were therefore “types of speech” protected by the 
First Amendment and could not be subjected to suit. 
The Fourth Circuit distinguished its “type of speech” analysis from 
the public/private categories associated with New York Times and Gertz. 
The court would have been wiser, however, to use the language of 
“falsity” instead of the expression “type of speech.” After New York 
Times, the Supreme Court ruled that public official/figure plaintiffs on 
matters of public concern must prove not only the fault (actual malice) of 
the speaker but also the falsity of the defamatory statement. In 
Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps,44 the Court also clarified that the 
First Amendment requires both a public-figure plaintiff and a private-
figure plaintiff on a matter of public concern to bear the burden of proof 
on falsity in order to prevail in a defamation lawsuit. In other words, in 
New York Times and Gertz cases proving falsity as well as fault is a 
constitutional requirement. Under this analysis, Snyder could not prove 
anything false about the signs and the website. They were either 
hyperbole or opinion containing no underlying false facts about Snyder, 
and there was nothing false about them. The Fourth Circuit used the 
language, “they do not assert provable facts about an individual”45 or they 
“cannot reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts about any 
individual.”46 In the Supreme Court’s language, the signs were not false. 
Hepps explained the reasons why the First Amendment requires 
placing the burden on plaintiffs to prove falsity rather than on 
defendants to prove truth: 
 
(1985)). 
 
43
 Id. at 219-20 (internal citations omitted). 
 
44
 475 U.S. 767, 775-76 (1986). 
 
45
 Snyder, 580 F.3d at 223. 
 
46
 Id. at 224. 
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There will always be instances when the factfinding process will be 
unable to resolve conclusively whether the speech is true or false; it is 
in those cases that the burden of proof is dispositive. Under a rule 
forcing the plaintiff to bear the burden of showing falsity, there will be 
some cases in which plaintiffs cannot meet their burden despite the 
fact that the speech is in fact false. The plaintiff’s suit will fail despite 
the fact that, in some abstract sense, the suit is meritorious. Similarly, 
under an alternative rule placing the burden of showing truth on 
defendants, there would be some cases in which defendants could not 
bear their burden despite the fact that the speech is in fact true. Those 
suits would succeed despite the fact that, in some abstract sense, those 
suits are unmeritorious. Under either rule, then, the outcome of the suit 
will sometimes be at variance with the outcome that we would desire 
if all speech were either demonstrably true or demonstrably false. 
 
This dilemma stems from the fact that the allocation of the burden of 
proof will determine liability for some speech that is true and some that 
is false, but all of such speech is unknowably true or false. Because the 
burden of proof is the deciding factor only when the evidence is 
ambiguous, we cannot know how much of the speech affected by the 
allocation of the burden of proof is true and how much is false. In a case 
presenting a configuration of speech and plaintiff like the one we face 
here, and where the scales are in such an uncertain balance, we believe 
that the Constitution requires us to tip them in favor of protecting true 
speech. To ensure that true speech on matters of public concern is not 
deterred, we hold that the common-law presumption that defamatory 
speech is false cannot stand when a [private-figure] plaintiff seeks 
damages against a media defendant for speech of public concern.47 
 
What about private figure plaintiffs involving matters of private 
concern? Should the constitutional scales tip in favor of the plaintiff 
proving falsity or the defendant proving truth? That is one of the issues 
that the Court could choose to resolve in Snyder v. Phelps. 
 
CONCLUSION: LEGAL ISSUES TO BE RESOLVED 
 
It is unclear why the Court granted certiorari in Snyder v. Phelps. 
The law of defamation itself, combined with its application to the privacy 
torts and intentional infliction of emotional distress, contains numerous 
gaps with unclear legal standards for the Court to fill, depending whether 
it wants to write a broad or narrow holding. It could narrowly rule that the 
facts of Snyder did not involve a matter of public concern, that 
Maryland’s state standards were applicable and reinstate the jury’s 
 
 
47
 Hepps, 475 U.S. at 776-77 (third emphasis added). 
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verdict. In doing so, it could clarify the private/private standard in a 
broad or narrow way. It could simply reinstate the verdict out of 
deference to the states, or it could uphold Maryland’s law because 
Maryland already requires fault in its torts lawsuits. The strict liability 
of common law could be abolished in favor of a fault-based system for 
all defamation lawsuits. 
A more ambitious Court would reconsider the public concern test, 
originally advocated as the key test by Justice Brennan in Rosenbloom 
and now a central part of the public-private figure/public-private 
concern framework,48 and decide whether the public/private concern 
standard survives the Internet era, when presumably almost everything 
has become a matter of public concern. From the beginning, some 
Justices worried that the public concern standard was too vague.49 The 
district court warned that the defendants should not be allowed “by their 
own actions [to] transform a private funeral into a public event and then 
bootstrap their position by arguing that Matthew Snyder was a public 
figure.”50 The Court could give more guidance about what qualifies as a 
matter of public concern or perhaps put some alternative new standard in 
its place. It would be interesting to see if the Roberts Court would really 
address perceived deficiencies in New York Times. 
Another option would be for the Court to distinguish the rules 
applying to media and non-media defendants, the route that the Vermont 
Supreme Court took when it issued its ruling in Dun & Bradstreet.51 Then 
private figure/public concern cases against media defendants would 
remain in the Gertz category, while private figure/public concern cases 
against non-media defendants (i.e., Snyder v. Phelps) would move to the 
Dun & Bradstreet box along with private figure/private concern cases. 
If the Court did resurrect the media/non-media distinction, however, 
it would still need to clarify whether it desired to “constitutionalize the 
entire common law of libel”52 or to leave the Dun & Bradstreet cases to 
the states, allowing them even to impose liability without fault and to 
presume falsity and damages as traditional common law did. Because the 
state courts enforce state defamation law, it seems a bad idea to rule that 
the First Amendment is not implicated by their judgments (although the 
Supreme Court may desire to do so). Yet, as Justice Marshall observed in 
Rosenbloom, “[t]he protection of the reputation of such anonymous 
persons ‘from unjustified invasion and wrongful hurt reflects no more 
than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human 
being—a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty.’”53 
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Instead of letting the jury members strike the balance between the private 
person and the First Amendment, as the instruction in Snyder ordered 
them to do, however, the Court should set some standard. 
Justice Harlan’s dissent in Rosenbloom concluded that “when 
dealing with private libel, the States should be free to define for 
themselves the applicable standard of care so long as they do not 
impose liability without fault; that a showing of actual damage should 
be a requisite to recovery for libel; and that it is impermissible, given 
the substantial constitutional values involved, to fail to confine the 
amount of jury verdicts in such cases within any ascertainable limits.”54 
In my terminology, “private libel” could now include lawsuits by 
private figures on matters of public concern against non-media 
defendants as well as by private figures on purely private concerns. 
In other words, the Court might well apply Gertz-like fault in the 
Dun & Bradstreet cases. Yet it could still distinguish the two types of 
cases by changing the rules on falsity. 
In dissent in Hepps, Justice Stevens challenged the majority’s 
decision to apply the falsity rule to private plaintiffs. By requiring 
private plaintiffs to prove fault, Stevens argued, “the antecedent fault 
determination makes irresistible the inference that a significant portion 
of this speech is beyond the constitutional pale.”55 Because of the 
“strong state interest in redressing injuries to private reputations,”56 he 
wrote, the First Amendment should not require “a private individual to 
bear the risk that a defamatory statement—uttered either with a mind 
toward assassinating his good name or with careless indifference to that 
possibility—cannot be proven false.”57 The error of Hepps, Stevens 
wrote, was the Court’s “mistaken belief that doubt regarding the 
veracity of a defamatory statement must invariably be resolved in favor 
of constitutional protection of the statement and against vindication of 
the reputation of the private individual.”58 
The Court could rule, in other words, that private plaintiffs (Albert 
Snyder) in matters of public concern against non-media defendants 
(Fred Phelps and Westboro Baptist Church) must prove fault 
(negligence) but not falsity. This seems more honest an outcome than 
concluding that the facts of the case involve a matter of “purely private 
concern” under Dun & Bradstreet. 
After cleaning up defamation, the Court would have to decide 
whether to transfer the same requirements over to intentional infliction of 
emotional distress and the privacy torts.59 In Maryland, all three torts at 
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issue in Snyder already contain fault elements. Maryland defamation law 
requires “(1) that Defendants made a defamatory communication to a 
third person, (2) that the statement was false, (3) that Defendants were at 
fault in communicating the statement, and (4) that Plaintiff suffered 
harm.”60 In a Maryland claim for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, “a plaintiff must demonstrate that the ‘defendant[s], intentionally 
or recklessly, engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct that caused the 
plaintiff to suffer severe emotional distress.’”61 The elements of a 
Maryland intrusion are: “(a) An intentional[;] (b) Intrusion or prying 
upon[;] (c) Something which is and is entitled to be private[;] (d) In a 
manner which is highly offensive to a reasonable person, considering the 
customs of the time and place, although public disclosure is not an 
element of the offense.”62 Without a falsity requirement, these would be 
the legal requirements that would govern Snyder v. Phelps. 
Yet leaving it all to Maryland law would be too easy. The petition for 
certiorari involves Hustler, and a key question therefore should be whether 
tort liability in non-defamation cases can only be based on speech that is 
defamatory. No court ruled that Snyder’s speech was defamatory but the 
jury found it to be outrageous, productive of emotional harm and intrusive. 
The Supreme Court could hold that what the Fourth Circuit should have 
said was that tort liability can only be based on speech that is defamatory. 
Defamatory speech is unprotected because it is false. The legal disputes 
about it involve only who should bear the burden of proof in ambiguous 
cases in proving truth or falsity. True speech is constitutionally protected. 
Outrageous and intrusive speech is often true, or at least not false because 
rhetorical and hyperbolic. Is there any non-defamatory speech that can 
form the basis of tort liability? 
Question three of the petition for certiorari—”Does an individual 
attending a family member’s funeral constitute a captive audience who 
is entitled to state protection from unwanted communication?63—
suggests that the plaintiffs are searching for another type of 
unprotected speech, separate from defamation, that would be an 
appropriate basis of tort liability. The petition identifies a split in the 
circuits about funeral picketing and the captive audience.64 The amicus 
brief for forty-eight states supporting the petitioner argues that 
“funerals represent a special circumstance warranting state protection” 
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and defends strong state anti-picketing laws.65 
Yet Snyder is the wrong case to make this argument. “It was 
undisputed at trial that Defendants complied with local ordinances and 
police directions with respect to being a certain distance from the 
church. Furthermore, it was established at trial that Snyder did not 
actually see the signs until he saw a television program later that day 
with footage of the Phelps family at his son’s funeral.”66 As 
Respondents explained, the Westboro Baptist Church members 
“picketed over 1,000 feet from a funeral . . . [and] were not seen by 
those going in; and did not impact or disrupt the funeral in any slightest 
degree.”67 The state laws governing picketing were enforced and 
observed.  The constitutional issues at stake in Snyder involve a 
different question, namely whether the First Amendment allows tort 
liability in circumstances when protesters obedient to the picketing laws 
inflict emotional distress upon and invade the privacy of the mourners. 
Understood in that way, the captive audience issue is another 
formulation of question one about Hustler—namely whether plaintiffs 
should be allowed to do an end run around picketing laws by collecting 
tort damages for defendants’ legal demonstrations.  State picketing laws 
are governed by the First Amendment, as must be the law of emotional 
distress and intrusion involving speech.68 
More interesting than the captive audience question is whether 
obscenity or fighting words (i.e., “speech that is directed at another and 
likely to provoke a violent response)”69 could form the basis of an 
intrusion or emotional distress lawsuit because these two categories of 
speech, like defamation, enjoy lesser First Amendment protection. The 
parties and the amici, however, have not raised this argument, so it is 
implausible that the Court would consider it. 
Why did the Court take Snyder v. Phelps? Will they use a bad case 
to make new law or decide that this is not the proper vehicle to redo the 
First Amendment? The district court judge dismissed the defamation 
count, and Judge Shedd ruled that Phelps’s actions were neither 
outrageous or intrusive under Maryland law. The whole case could be 
dismissed under state law without the need for any constitutional ruling. 
Or the Court could constitutionalize the law of libel, emotional distress 
and privacy in one big ruling. 
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